

## Message Text

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: OVIP (VANCE, CYRUS)

SUBJECT: Q'S AND A'S FOR SECRETARY'S LONDON PRESS  
CONFERENCE

THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ARE FOR USE IN THE  
SECRETARY'S LONDON PRESS CONFERENCE ON JUNE 16:

Q. THE PRESIDENT'S ANNAPOLIS SPEECH HAS BEEN CRITICIZED  
FOR NOT DOING WHAT IT WAS SUPPOSED TO DO -- CLARIFY  
THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY TOWARDS THE USSR. HOW DO  
YOU REACT TO THOSE CRITICISMS? CAN YOU FURTHER  
CLARIFY OUR POLICY?

A. I THINK THE PROBLEM IS NOT ONE OF CONTRADICTIONS IN  
OUR POLICY, BUT OF CONTRADICTIONS IN THE US-SOVIET  
RELATIONSHIP. LET ME BRIEFLY RECAPITULATE THE MAIN POINTS  
OF THE SPEECH. WHILE THE US-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP IS A  
COMPETITIVE ONE, THE US IS COMMITTED TO SEEKING IMPROVEMENT  
IN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND TO REDUCING  
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TENSIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, CERTAIN TYPES OF BEHAVIOR BY  
THE SOVIET UNION ARE NOT CONTRIBUTING TO THAT PROCESS AND  
ARE THREATENING TO UNDERMINE PUBLIC SUPPORT IN THE US FOR  
SUCH A POLICY. IN OUR OWN SELF-INTEREST WE REMAIN

COMMITTED TO NEGOTIATING A FAIR SALT AGREEMENT. WE HAVE  
NO DESIRE TO LINK SALT WITH OTHER ISSUES IN OUR RELATION-

SHIP, BUT WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT TENSIONS AND DISPUTES  
CAN COMPLICATE OUR EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT AN AGREEMENT.

THERE ARE NO SIGNIFICANT DISAGREEMENTS WITHIN THIS  
ADMINISTRATION ON OUR POLICY TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION.  
OBVIOUSLY, THERE MAY BE DIFFERENCE IN NUANCE ON CERTAIN  
ISSUES, BUT THE POLICY OUTLINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH  
REPRESENTS A UNIFIED VIEW, NOT A COMPROMISE OF DIFFERING  
VIEWS.

I REEMPHASIZE THAT WE ARE COMMITTED TO SEEKING AN  
IMPROVEMENT IN US-SOVIET RELATIONS, TO BUILDING ON AND  
WIDENING THE COOPERATIVE ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP, AND  
TO NARROWING DIFFERENCES WHICH EXIST BETWEEN US. TO THE  
EXTENT THE SOVIET UNION SHARES THESE GOALS AND ACTS  
ACCORDINGLY, US-SOVIET RELATIONS CAN MOVE FORWARD.

Q. CAN YOU CONFIRM THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN  
CONDUCTING INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION,  
INCLUDING THE USE OF FATAL POISONS?

A. I AM FAMILIAR WITH THE RECENT ALLEGATIONS IN THE  
SOVIET PRESS, BUT I DON'T INTEND TO DISCUSS INTELLIGENCE  
ACTIVITIES.

SOV/HUMAN RIGHTS  
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Q. HAS THE ADMINISTRATION'S STAND ON HUMAN RIGHTS HAD  
ANY APPARENT EFFECT ON SOVIET POLICIES IN THIS AREA?

A. WE BELIEVE THE ADMINISTRATION'S HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY  
HAS HAD THE EFFECT OF RAISING THE CONSCIOUSNESS, AND  
INCREASING THE AWARENESS OF THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUALS  
AROUND THE WORLD. SOVIET DISSIDENTS GENERALLY HAVE  
WELCOMED THE AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THEIR CAUSE WHICH THEY  
ASSOCIATE WITH PRESIDENT CARTER. THEY KNOW, HOWEVER, THAT  
THERE IS LITTLE BEYOND WHAT WE HAVE DONE ALREADY THAT WE  
CAN DO TO HELP THEM DIRECTLY. IF WE CONSISTENTLY AND  
PERSISTENTLY PROMOTE RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, WE BELIEVE  
THIS CAN HAVE A POSITIVE EFFECT ON THE POLICIES OF  
COUNTRIES WHERE THERE ARE HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS, INCLUDING  
THE USSR.

WITHOUT TAKING ANY CREDIT, WE NOTE RECENT  
IMPROVEMENTS IN HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES  
INCLUDING PARAGUAY, CHILE, INDONESIA, AND KOREA. IT IS  
A MIXED PICTURE TO BE SURE, BUT WE THINK IT IS MORE  
POSITIVE THAN NEGATIVE.

Q. WHAT IS THE ADMINISTRATION'S VIEW OF "EURO-COMMUNISM"?

A. -- THIS TERM USUALLY REFERS TO THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF FRANCE, ITALY, AND SPAIN. EACH IS DIFFERENT IN ITS HISTORY AND COMPOSITION; IN ITS DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION; IN THE DEFENSE OF ITS ALLEGED INDEPENDENCE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES; AND IN THE HARMONY OF ITS PROFESSED VIEWS WITH THOSE OF OTHER WEST EUROPEAN PARTIES.

-- WE UNDERSTAND THOSE DIFFERENCES. BUT THE BEHAVIOR AND DECLARED POSITIONS OF EACH OF THEM STILL GIVES US REASON FOR CONCERN ABOUT HOW ITS BEHAVIOR IN GOVERNMENT LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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WOULD AFFECT THE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRY CONCERNED, AND THAT COUNTRY'S ABILITY TO COOPERATE ON A RANGE OF ISSUES NOT ONLY WITH US, BUT WITH ITS WEST EUROPEAN PARTNERS.

-- WE RECOGNIZE THAT EACH COUNTRY MUST AND SHOULD MAKE ITS OWN POLITICAL CHOICES, AND WE DON'T WANT TO INTERFERE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF ANOTHER DEMOCRACY. AT THE SAME TIME, WE DO NOT WANT OUR NON-INTERFERENCE TO BE READ AS INDIFFERENCE, OR AS A SIGNAL THAT OUR DOUBTS ABOUT

THESE PARTIES HAD BEEN RESOLVED. THE ITALIAN PARTY IN PARTICULAR HAS TRIED TO USE OUR STANCE OF NON-INTERVENTION AS A SIGN OF "ACCEPTANCE", IN ORDER TO FURTHER ITS QUEST FOR LEGITIMACY. FOR THAT REASON, WE MADE CLEAR LAST JANUARY OUR DOUBTS ABOUT THESE PARTIES AND OUR HOPE THAT THEIR INFLUENCE WOULD NOT GROW, AND MIGHT BE REDUCED.

-- THE BEST WAY TO COMBAT THE COMMUNIST CHALLENGE IS OF COURSE FOR NON-COMMUNIST PARTIES TO BE RESPONSIVE TO THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC NEEDS OF THEIR PEOPLE.

ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: EUROPE

Q. THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK IN EUROPE IS NOT VERY ENCOURAGING. DO YOU EXPECT THE JULY ECONOMIC SUMMIT IN BONN OT HAVE ANY IMPACT ON THAT RATHER BLEAK SITUATION?

A. WHILE WE STILL FACE SERIOUS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, THE SITUATION IS PERHAPS NOT AS BLEAK AS THE QUESTION WOULD IMPLY. INFLATION HAS BEEN BROUGHT DOWN DRAMATICALLY COMPARED WITH 1975, REAL OUTPUT IS UP, AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS POSITIONS OF SEVERAL COUNTRIES HAVE IMPROVED. LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE, HOWEVER. THE OECD MINISTERIAL, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL IN BREMEN, AND THE BONN SUMMIT WILL ALL SERVE TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON CURRENT ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, AND ON WHAT EACH COUNTRY CAN AND SHOULD DO SO THAT, BY WORKING TOGETHER, WE MAY IMPROVE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS FOR ALL. WE SHOULD GO INTO THE BONN SUMMIT WITH A GOOD IDEA OF THE PRESENT STATE OF THE WORLD ECONOMY AND WITH A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE SUCCESS OF OUR ENDEAVORS WILL DEPEND ON EACH COUNTRY DOING ITS PART TO ACHIEVE CONCERTED ACTION INVOLVING TRADE LIBERALIZATION, EFFORTS TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC GROWTH AND REDUCE INFLATION, THE REDUCTION OF DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN ENERGY, AND AGREEMENT FOR CRITERIA FOR POSITIVE ADJUSTMENT POLICIES TO PHASE OUT OBSOLETE CAPACITY.

NATO

Q. NATO LEADERS MET IN WASHINGTON AT THE END OF LAST MONTH. DID THAT MEETING HAVE ANY REAL-SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE FUTURE OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE?

A. -- THE PRINCIPAL REASON FOR THE SUMMIT WAS TO REVIEW THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY CHALLENGES THAT WILL FACE THE ALLIES IN THE NEXT DECADE AND TO TAKE NECESSARY STEPS TO MEET THOSE CHALLENGES. THE CENTRAL

OBJECTIVE OF THE SUMMIT WAS TO FOLLOW THROUGH ON THE INITIATIVES ADOPTED BY THE ALLIES AT THE LONDON SUMMIT IN MAY 1977: THE EAST-WEST STUDY, THE LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM (LTDP), AND IMPROVED NATO ARMAMENTS COOPERATION.

-- THE ALLIES DISCUSSED HOW THE ALLIANCE SHOULD COPE WITH THE CONTINUING EXCESSIVE BUILD-UP OF WARSAW PACT FORCES IN EUROPE AND WITH THE INCREASING PROJECTION OF SOVIET POWER OUTSIDE EUROPE.

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-- THE ALLIES DECIDED THAT THE MAINTENANCE OF UNDIMINISHED AND, IF POSSIBLE, IMPROVED SECURITY AT LOWER LEVELS OF ARMAMENTS AND ARMED FORCES MUST BE A CONSTANT AIM.

-- THE ALLIES AGREED THAT NATO MUST TAKE NECESSARY STEPS TO MAINTAIN A CREDIBLE DETERRENT AND DEFENSE POSTURE, WHILE CONTINUING TO SUPPORT THE CONCEPT OF FORWARD

DEFENSE BASED ON ADEQUATE CONVENTIONAL, THEATRE NUCLEAR AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES THROUGH THE 1980'S.

-- TO FULFULL THESE OBJECTIVES, THE ALLIES ADOPTED A LTDP. IT MARKS A SIGNIFICANT MILESTONE FOR NATO THROUGH ITS PROJECTIONS OF ALLIANCE DEFENSE PLANNING INTO A LONG-TERM FRAMEWORK AND ITS EMPHASIS ON MUCH CLOSER COORDINATION IN NATO DEFENSE PLANNING.

-- THE PARTICIPATING ALLIES, IN APPROVING THE LTDP AS A COURSE OF ACTION, PLEDGED THEIR FULL SUPPORT FOR THE INTENSIVE CIVIL AND MILITARY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS NEEDED AT NATIONAL AND NATO LEVELS TO INSURE THE VIGOROUS AND SUSTAINED FOLLOW-THROUGH THAT WILL BE NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE THE LTDP'S PURPOSE.

MBFR

Q. WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE TALKS ON MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE?

A. THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE MOVEMENT IN THE MBFR TALKS SINCE THEY BEGAN FIVE YEARS AGO. WE AND OUR ALLIES TOOK A MAJOR STEP IN APRIL, TABLING A NEW INITIATIVE THAT WE HOPE WILL LEAD TO PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE WARSAW PACT PARTICIPANTS HAVE NOW MADE NEW PROPOSALS IN VIENNA. LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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THE NEGOTIATING POSITIONS OF THE TWO SIDES DIFFER SUBSTANTIALLY ON A NUMBER OF ESSENTIAL POINTS, AND IT IS NOT YET CLEAR THAT THE WAY IS OPEN TO MOVE TOWARD AN AGREEMENT THAT RESULTS IN REAL PARITY AND INCREASES STABILITY IN

IN EUROPE. BUT ANY MOVE THAT MAY INDICATE THAT THE LEADERS OF THE SOVIET UNION, AND OTHER WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES, WANT TO MOVE INTO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT SECURITY IN EUROPE WILL BE WELCOMED BY THIS ADMINISTRATION. WE AND OUR ALLIES WILL STUDY THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSALS CAREFULLY.

Q. HOW DO SOVIET ACTIONS IN AFRICA SQUARE WITH THIS ADMINISTRATION'S VIEWS OF DETENTE?

A. AS THE PRESIDENT SAID IN ANNAPOLIS, SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA, PARTICULARLY THEIR MILITARY INTERVENTION IN LOCAL CONFLICTS, IS OF SERIOUS CONCERN TO THIS ADMINISTRATION. PRESENTLY, AFRICA IS ONE OF THE AREAS OF COMPETITION IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS.

-- THE PERSISTENT INCREASE OF SOVIET-CUBAN MILITARY

INVOLVEMENT COULD DENY THE VISION WE HAVE FOR AFRICA, ONE OF A CONTINENT FREE OF OUTSIDE INTERVENTION, RACIAL BITTERNESS, CONFLICT, AND THE BURDENS OF HUNGER, POVERTY AND DISEASE.

-- WE LOOK FORWARD TO A RAPID, COMPREHENSIVE AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT TO THE PROBLEMS OF ACHIEVING MAJORITY RULE IN RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA. WE BELIEVE THAT ONLY A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND SOMALIA WHICH PROTECTS THE RIGHTS OF ETHNIC SOMALIS IN THE OGADEN CAN PROVIDE A LASTING SOLUTION TO THAT CONFLICT. FURTHER, WE SUPPORT EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS TO CONFLICTS IN ERITREA AND ANGOLA.

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-- WE CALL UPON THE SOVIET UNION TO CEASE ITS POLICY OF ARMED INTERVENTION AND TO JOIN WITH US IN ASSISTING AFRICAN NATIONS TO SEEK TRULY LASTING SOLUTIONS TO THEIR PROBLEMS.

Q: THE ADMINISTRATION SEEMS TO SPEAK WITH MANY VOICES ON AFRICA. THERE IS AN APPARENT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND WHITE HOUSE ON HOW STRONGLY WE SHOULD CONFRONT THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS IN AFRICA. WHAT IS THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S POSITION ON THIS POINT?

A: THE IDEA OF A "SPLIT" BETWEEN THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND WHITE HOUSE MAKES FOR INTERESTING READING AND HAS ADDED ZEST TO A NUMBER OF PRESS STORIES. THE ASSUMPTION IS QUITE WIDE OF THE MARK.

I THINK THE BEST WAY TO RESPOND IS TO LOOK AT THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY AS IT HAS ACTUALLY EMERGED. THERE IS NO DISAGREEMENT ON OUR VIEW OF THE EVENTS IN THE HORN. THERE WAS NO DIFFERENCE OF OPINION ON THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO ASSIST IN A LIMITED FASHION THE EFFORT TO EVACUATE FOREIGN NATIONALS FROM SHABA PROVINCE. THERE IS AGREEMENT THAT WE SHOULD, IN A MEASURED AND CLEARLY LIMITED WAY, PROVIDE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO UNITS OF AFRICAN TROOPS WHICH ARE NOW GOING TO SHABA TO INSURE ITS SECURITY AND THEREBY PROTECT ITS ECONOMIC VIABILITY. THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE OF OPINION ON OUR SOUTHERN AFRICA POLICY. AS OUR POLICIES ARE FORMULATED, THERE ARE UNDERSTANDABLY SOME DIFFERENCES IN EMPHASIS. THESE ARE TO BE EXPECTED AND HEALTHY.

Q: THERE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN A CLEAR SHIFT IN OUR AFRICA POLICY FROM AN EMPHASIS ON DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATION TO A SHARPER CONFRONTATION WITH THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS. IS LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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THIS TRUE?

A: I THINK IF WE COMPARE THE FUNDAMENTAL POINTS OF OUR POLICY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE ADMINISTRATION AND TODAY, IT IS CLEAR THAT THOSE FUNDAMENTALS REMAIN THE SAME. WE ARE CERTAINLY NOT SEEKING WAYS TO CONFRONT THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS. IF OUR RESTRAINT IS NOT MET BY A SIMILAR ATTITUDE BY THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS, WE MAY NEED TO CONSIDER ACTIONS WHICH ARE DIFFERENT IN SOME DEGREE. THE POINT, HOWEVER, IS THAT THESE WILL STILL BE GUIDED BY AN ATTITUDE OF RESTRAINT; THEY WILL BE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED, LIMITED AND DIRECTED AT WHAT IS BEST FOR THE UNITED STATES AND FOR AFRICA -- NOT AT WHAT IS LIKELY TO CAUSE THE GREATEST DISCOMFORT FOR THE SOVIET UNION OR CUBA.

Q: THERE IS A CONTRADICTION BETWEEN WHAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAS SAID AND WHAT FIDEL CASTRO HAS SAID REGARDING WHETHER OR NOT CASTRO ATTEMPTED TO DISSUADE THE ANGOLANS FROM PERMITTING KATANGESE REBELS TO LAUNCH AN ATTACK ON

ZAIRE FROM INSIDE ANGOLA. WOULD YOU CARE TO COMMENT?

A: FIDEL CASTRO TOLD OUR INTERESTS SECTION THAT HE HAD WARNED THE NETO GOVERNMENT A MONTH BEFORE THE ATTACK THAT HE HAD REPORTS THE KATANGESE WERE PREPARING TO INVADE SHABA PROVINCE. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT HE THEREFORE HAD SUBSTANTIAL FOREKNOWLEDGE THAT AN ATTACK WAS PLANNED. THE CUBANS HAVE GREAT INFLUENCE WITH THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT AND PRESUMABLY WITH THE KATANGESE WHOM THEY TRAINED. YET THE ATTACK TOOK PLACE. WE THEREFORE CONCLUDE THAT OBVIOUSLY NOTHING WAS DONE TO PREVENT IT.

Q: WHAT SPECIFICALLY ARE YOU DOING TO COUNTER SOVIET AND CUBAN MEDDLING IN AFRICA?

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A: IN OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND IN OUR PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS AND THE CUBANS WE HAVE MADE KNOWN OUR SERIOUS AND DEEP CONCERN WITH SOVIET AND CUBAN ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA. WE HAVE TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT THEIR CONTINUED ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA POSE A DANGER TO OUR OVERALL RELATIONS.

WE HAVE SOUGHT THE SUPPORT OF OTHER NATIONS WHO SHARE OUR CONCERN TO URGE RESTRAINT ON THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS. WE WILL CONSIDER SYMPATHETICALLY REQUESTS FOR ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM THOSE AFRICAN NATIONS WHO HAVE LEGITIMATE SECURITY NEEDS AND ARE FACED WITH A BUILDUP OF CUBAN TROOPS AND SOVIET ARMS ON THEIR BORDER. WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK FOR THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS IN AFRICA. IN DOING SO, WE DENY THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS A PRETEXT FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION.

Q: HAS THE US MADE A COMMITMENT TO AN AFRICAN FORCE?

A: WE HAVE NOT UNDERTAKEN ANY COMMITMENT FOR THE CREATION OR SUPPORT OF A GENERAL PAN-AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE. OUR ACTIONS HAVE BEEN EXCLUSIVELY FOCUSED ON THE SECURITY NEEDS OF SHABA PROVINCE. IN ANY CASE, ANY SUCH FORCE SHOULD BE CREATED BY THE AFRICANS THEMSELVES, PRESUMABLY UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE OAU.

AFRICAN TROOPS IN SHABA ARE THEREAT THE REQUEST OF ZAIRE AND IN RESPONSE TO AN APPEAL FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY. AT THE REQUEST OF THE GOVERNMENTS INVOLVED, FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE PROVIDED LOGISTICAL SUPPORT. THE US ROLE IS LIMITED TO AN AIRLIFT, PRIMARILY OF HEAVY EQUIPMENT FOR WHICH WE HAVE A UNIQUE CAPABILITY. I HAVE AUTHORIZED A LIMITED NUMBER

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OF MISSIONS TO MOVE AFRICAN TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT INTO ZAIRE TO COINCIDE WITH THE RETURN OF FRENCH LEGIONAIRES TO FRANCE.

Q: WHAT COMMITMENTS TO ZAIRE HAVE BEEN MADE IN THE PARIS AND BRUSSELS MEETINGS?

A: THE PARIS MEETING FOCUSED ON THE INTERTWINED ECONOMIC AND SECURITY PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE INVASION OF SHABA. A WIDE RANGE OF ISSUES WERE DISCUSSED INCLUDING SUPPORT FOR THE AFRICAN FORCES PRESENTLY BEING DEPLOYED IN SHABA. WE MADE NO COMMITMENTS, BUT GENERALLY AGREED THAT A JOINT, COORDINATED RESPONSE WOULD BE REQUIRED TO SOLVE ZAIRE'S PROBLEMS.

AT THE BRUSSELS MEETING WE WILL LISTEN TO EXPLANATIONS OF THE "MOBUTU PLAN" WHICH IS A ZAIRIAN PROPOSAL FOR A THREE YEAR STRATEGY OF ECONOMIC STABILIZATION. WE SEEK DETAILED AND SPECIFIC INFORMATION WHICH WILL AID IN OUR EVALUATION CONCERNING THE POSSIBILITY OF ADDITIONAL AMERICAN ASSISTANCE. SHOULD WE DECIDE TO PROCEED WITH SOME ADDITIONAL AID WE WOULD SEEK TO COORDINATE OUR ASSISTANCE SO THAT IT WOULD WELL AND EFFECTIVELY RESPOND TO ZAIRE'S NEEDS. IN THIS CONTEXT WE REQUIRE ASSURANCES



THAT FUNDAMENTAL REFORM BE A REQUISITE PART OF ANY ASSISTANCE PACKAGE.

Q: CAN YOU BRING US UP-TO-DATE ON ANGOLA-AMERICAN EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT A SETTLEMENT OF THE RHODESIA PROBLEM?

A: JOHN GRAHAM OF THE BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE AND STEPHEN LOW, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO ZAMBIA ARE IN SALISBURY THIS WEEK WHERE THEY ARE HOLDING DISCUSSIONS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND OTHERS WHO REPRESENT POLITICAL VIEWPOINTS WITHIN RHODESIA.

IN THESE DISCUSSIONS, MR. GRAHAM AND AMBASSADOR LOW ARE SEEKING WAYS TO NARROW THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PARTIES IN ORDER TO PAVE THE WAY FOR AN ALL-PARTIES MEETING. LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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AFTER LEAVING SALISBURY, MR. GRAHAM AND AMBASSADOR LOW PLAN TO VISIT CERTAIN FRONT-LINE STATES FOR MEETINGS WITH HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. -THE SCHEDULE FOR THESE MEETINGS HAS NOT YET BEEN FIRMLY SET.

Q: WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE WESTERN CONTACT GROUP'S PROPOSALS FOR NAMIBIA?

A: WE ARE ENCOURAGED BY REPORTS WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM THE WEEKEND SUMMIT ON NAMIBIA HELD BY THE FRONT-LINE IN LUANDA THAT SWAPO HAS AGREED TO MEET AGAIN WITH THE

CONTACT GROUP.

IN THE DAYS AHEAD WE WILL BE DISCUSSING WITH OUR WESTERN PARTNERS AND WITH THE OTHER CONCERNED PARTIES THE NEXT STEPS TO BE TAKEN.

Q. WHAT IS THE CURRENT SITUATION IN ERITREA?

A. IN MID-MAY, BOTH THE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE ERITREAN MOVEMENTS MADE STATEMENTS SUGGESTING THAT A MAJOR ETHIOPIAN OFFENSIVE HAD BEEN LAUNCHED IN ERITREA. WE DO NOT HAVE COMPLETE INFORMATION ON THE SITUATION, BUT OUR BEST ESTIMATE NOW IS THAT, WHILE THERE HAS BEEN SOME INCREASE IN THE PACE OF THE FIGHTING IN RECENT WEEKS, THIS IS ESSENTIALLY A CONTINUATION OF WHAT WAS ALREADY GOING ON -- FIGHTING AROUND ASMARA AND ONE OR TWO OF THE OTHER CITIES IN THE REGION BETWEEN THE ETHIOPIAN FORCES OCCUPYING THE CITIES AND THE REBEL FORCES IN THE HINTERLAND -- AND THAT THE ETHIOPIANS HAVE NOT YET LAUNCHED THE KIND OF CONCERTED OFFENSIVE THAT HAS BEEN WIDELY PREDICTED FOLLOWING THEIR BUILDUP OF FORCES IN LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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ERITREA. THE BUILDUP, HOWEVER, IS CONTINUING.

Q. ARE THE CUBANS AND SOVIETS GETTING INVOLVED IN THE FIGHTING IN ERITREA?

A. OUR LATEST INFORMATION INDICATES THAT THERE ARE NO CUBAN COMBAT UNITS IN ERITREA. THERE ARE CUBAN ADVISORY AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL, AND THERE HAVE BEEN SOME INDICATIONS THAT CUBAN PILOTS MAY HAVE FLOWN SOME MISSIONS.

Q. WHAT IS OUR POLICY TOWARD ERITREA?

A. WE BELIEVE THAT THE ERITREAN SITUATION SHOULD BE RESOLVED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE ERITREAN MOVEMENTS AND THE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THIS PROBLEM IS SUSCEPTIBLE TO MILITARY RESOLUTION. WHILE THE ULTIMATE OUTCOME IS FOR THE PARTICIPANTS TO DETERMINE, WE BELIEVE THAT A SOLUTION COULD BE BASED ON SOME FORM OF ERITREAN AUTONOMY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF ETHIOPIAN SOVEREIGNTY.

TURKISH ARMS EMBARGO

Q. WHY DOES THIS ADMINISTRATION FEEL REPEAL OF THE TURKISH ARMS EMBARGO IS NECESSARY? WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS FOR LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO?

A. -- THE ADMINISTRATION HAS PROPOSED THE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO BECAUSE OF ITS STRONG CONVICTION THAT THE ARMS RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED ON TURKEY IN EARLY 1975 HAVE CLEARLY OUTLIVED THEIR USEFULNESS. THE EMBARGO HAS NOT PROMPTED A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT, AND IS PARTLY RESPONSIBLE

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FOR A DETERIORATION IN TURKEY'S MILITARY POSITION WHICH IS DAMAGING TO U.S. AND NATO INTERESTS. A NEW COURSE OF ACTION SEEMS REQUIRED TO: (A) SAFEGUARD U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, (B) IMPROVE PROSPECTS FOR BETTER RELATIONS WITH GREECE AND TURKEY, AND (C) FACILITATE PROGRESS TOWARD A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT.

-- WE HAVE DETECTED CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT FOR THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSALS AND WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT A MAJORITY IN BOTH HOUSES OF THE CONGRESS WILL ACT TO REPEAL THE RESTRICTIONS ON ARMS SHIPMENTS TO TURKEY.

CYPRUS

Q. WHAT IS THE OUTLOOK FOR A SETTLEMENT OF THE CYPRUS SITUATION?

A. -- WE BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A GOOD LIKELIHOOD THAT PROGRESS CAN BE MADE TOWARDS A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT IF AND WHEN THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS ARE RESUMED. BOTH SIDES HAVE NOW PUT FORWARD CONCRETE AND SUBSTANTIAL PROPOSALS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND TERRITORIAL ISSUES WHICH CAN SERVE AS A STARTING-POINT FOR A PRODUCTIVE DIALOGUE. MOREOVER, IN CONTRAST TO PAST POSITIONS, THE GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY AND THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS HAVE GIVEN EXPLICIT ASSURANCES THAT THEY INTEND TO BE VERY FORTHCOMING AND TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH.

-- THE CURRENT PROBLEM, THEN, IS TO PERSUADE THE PARTIES TO RETURN TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. REALISTICALLY SPEAKING, THIS MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE UNTIL THE ISSUE OF THE TURKISH ARMS EMBARGO HAS BEEN DECIDED  
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ONE WAY OR THE OTHER.

CHINA - NORMALIZATION SCHEDULE

Q. THERE WERE JAPANESE PRESS REPORTS OVER THE WEEKEND THAT SINO-U.S. RELATIONS WILL BE FORMALIZED EARLY NEXT YEAR- THERE STORIES ALSO MAINTAINED THAT THE U.S. HAS AGREED TO ACCEPT PEKING'S THREE CONDITIONS FOR NORMALIZATION. CAN YOU CONFIRM THESE REPORTS?

A. -- OUR POLICY ON RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IS BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE OF 1972. WE HAVE REPEATEDLY STATED THAT THE GOAL OF OUR EFFORTS IS THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH CHINA.

-- AT THE SAME TIME, WE HAVE CONSTANTLY OBSERVED THAT NO DEADLINE OR SCHEDULE HAS BEEN AFFIXED TO COMPLETION OF THIS NORMALIZATION PROCESS.

Q. BUT SOME PEOPLE SEE IN THE DAEDALUS SALE OF EQUIPMENT TO PEKING AND IN DR. BRZEZINSKI'S RECENT TRIP THERE INDICATIONS OF A U.S. ACCELERATION TOWARDS NORMALIZATION.

IS THIS A VALID INTERPRETATION?

A. -- NO. OUR EXPORT LICENSING DECISIONS ARE BASED UPON THE TECHNICAL MERITS OF EACH CASE IN TERMS OF ITS POTENTIAL EFFECT ON OUR SECURITY AND THAT OF OUR ALLIES. WE HAVE ALREADY POINTED OUT THAT DR. BRZEZINSKI'S VISIT TO CHINA WAS IN LINE WITH THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE WHICH CONTEMPLATED SUCH MEETINGS.

-- AS I SAID BEFORE, OUR GOAL IS NORMATION OF RELATIONS WITH CHINA ALONG THE PRINCIPLES OF THE SHANGHAI CO;MUNIQUE, BUT I CANNOT GIVE ANY SPECIFICS OF THE PROCESS AS TO TIMING OR THE MODALITIES INVOLVED.  
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KOREA - HOUSE RESOLUTION

Q. WHAT IS YOUR REACTION TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES' ADOPTION OF A RESOLUTION THREATENING TO DENY OR REDUCE NON-MILITARY FUNDS FOR THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA UNLESS SOME US-ROK AGREEMENT IS REACHED ON OBTAINING EVIDENCE FROM FORMER AMBASSADOR KIM DONG JO ABOUT "KOREAGATE?"

A. -- AS WE HAVE SAID, WE SHARE THE DESIRE OF THE CONGRESS TO BRING THE PRESENT INVESTIGATION TO A SATISFACTORY CONCLUSION AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. I WILL CONTINUE IN EVERY APPROPRIATE WAY TO FACILITATE THOSE EFFORTS.

-- HOWEVER, WE VERY MUCH REGRET THAT THE RESOLUTION WAS PASSED BY THE HOUSE. THE USE OF IMPLIED PRESSURE AND SANCTIONS TO COMPEL A SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT TO WAIVE ITS RIGHTS UNDER THE VIENNA CONVENTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES IS, IN MY JUDGMENT, CONTRARY TO THE CONVENTION.

TAIWAN - U.S. ARMS SALES

Q. WHAT IS YOUR REACTION TO WEEKEND NEWS REPORTS THAT THE UNITED STATES IS CONSIDERING SELLING THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 60 F-4 FIGHTER-BOMBERS?

A. -- WE HAVE A NUMBER OF DIFFERENT REQUESTS FROM THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, AND THESE ARE ALL UNDER CONSIDERATION.

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-- HOWEVER, I AM NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS ANY OF THE SPECIFICS OF THESE REQUESTS.

CURRENT STATUS OF MIDDLE EAST PEACE EFFORTS

Q: WHERE DO MIDDLE EAST PEACE EFFORTS NOW STAND?

A: --THE PEACE-MAKING PROCESS HAS BEEN AND REMAINS THE CENTRAL FOCUS OF AMERICAN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

--ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT EXPECT INSTANT SOLUTIONS, WE BELIEVE THE STAGE HAS BEEN SET FOR MOVEMENT FORWARD, AND WE ARE CONTINUING OUR INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS WITH BOTH ISRAEL AND EGYPT TO THAT END.

--THE FOCAL POINT OF THESE CONSULTATIONS AT PRESENT IS THE ISSUE OF THE FUTURE OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AND THE ROLE OF THE PALESTINIANS IN RESOLVING THIS QUESTION. IT IS NOW THE KEY TO PROGRESS, AND WE ARE AWAITING ANSWERS FROM THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TO THE QUESTIONS WE POSED ON THIS SUBJECT. AS YOU KNOW, THE ISRAELI CABINET HAS BEEN DISCUSSING THESE QUESTIONS AT ITS LAST TWO CABINET MEETINGS AND WE UNDERSTAND IT WILL CONTINUE DELIBERATION ON THEM IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

--FROM THE OUTSET LAST DECEMBER WE SAID THAT THE PLAN PRIME MINISTER BEGIN PUT FORWARD ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WAS A CONSTRUCTIVE STARTING POINT FOR NEGOTIATIONS. WE ARE NOW SEEKING CONCRETE WAYS TO MOVE THOSE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD.

--WE ARE ALSO EXPLORING WITH PRESIDENT SADAT HOW HE MIGHT CONTRIBUTE HIS OWN IDEAS TO FINDING A WAY OUT OF THE CURRENT IMPASSE OVER THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE. AMBASSADOR ELITS, WHO HAS HAD LONG TALKS WITH PRESIDENT SADAT AND FOREIGN MINISTER KAMEL IN THE PAST FEW WEEKS, HAS JUST BEEN HERE FOR CONSULTATIONS.

--OUR ROLE IS TO HELP THE PARTIES FIND A MIDDLE GROUND. THAT MEANS HELPING THEM FIND A FORMULA WHEREBY A PRACTICAL SOLUTION FOR THE FUTURE OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA CAN BE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
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NEGOTIATED WITHIN THE TERMS OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242.

--OUR VIEW IS THAT THE ISSUES OF SECURITY AND OF THE FINAL STATUS OF THESE TERRITORIES CAN BE SEPARATED--AS ISRAEL HAS ALREADY AGREED TO DO IN ITS PROPOSAL TO EGYPT ON THE SINAI. THIS WOULD PROVIDE A PRACTICAL BASIS TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD.

--WE BELIEVE THAT THE PRINCIPLES OF RESOLUTION 242, INCLUDING THE PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL, MUST APPLY TO ALL FRONTS. WE ARE NOT SAYING THAT AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO WITHDRAW FROM THE WEST BANK AND GAZA TERRITORY DETERMINES

THE TIMING, CIRCUMSTANCES--OR EVEN THE EXTENT--OF ACTUAL WITHDRAWAL. THAT WOULD TAKE PLACE ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF A FINAL PEACE TREATY ENBODYING COMMITMENTS TO NORMAL PEACEFUL RELATIONS AND AGREED SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, INCLUDING POSSIBLY AGREED BORDER CHANGES.

--WE ARE NOT ASKING ISRAEL FOR ONE-SIDED COMPROMISES. OVER THE PAST MONTHS, WE HAVE MADE IT PLAIN TO THE ARAB SIDE THAT WE DO NOT AGREE WITH KEY ELEMENTS OF THEIR POSITION. FOR INSTANCE, WE DO NOT AGREE WITH THEIR CALL FOR A PRIOR COMMITMENT OF ISRAEL TO TOTAL WITHDRAWAL--WHICH RESOLUTION 242 NEITHER ENDORSES NOR PRECLUDES. WE HAVE ALSO MADE CLEAR WE FAVOR A PALESTINIAN ENTITY LINKED TO JORDAN RATHER THAN AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE.

--BUT THE PEACE-MAKING PROCESS MUST BE SEEN AS A SEQUENCE OF COMPROMISES AS ONE SIDE AND THE OTHER FACE KEY ISSUES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

--LAST NOVEMBER PRESIDENT SADAT--WITHOUT ANY PRIOR NOTICE TO US--INDICATED BY WORD AND DEED IN JERUSALEM THAT THE KEY ARAB STATE WAS READY TO MAKE PEACE WITH ISRAEL. TO THE ARAB SIDE THIS WAS AN ENORMOUS COMPROMISE.

--ISRAEL AND EGYPT HAVE HAD DIFFERENT PERCEPTIONS OF WHAT LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
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SHOULD FOLLOW FROM THAT ACT. THESE DIFFERENCES HAVE BEDEVILLED THE DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BEGUN IN JERUSALEM. OUR ROLE AS MIDDLEMAN HAS BEEN TO HELP MOLD THE PERCEPTIONS OF WHAT EACH SEES AS THE PRACTICAL APPROACH TO THE NEGOTIATIONS, SO AS TO GET THEM BACK TO THE BARGAINING TABLE.

--WE ARE NOT SIMPLY A POSTMAN BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. AT DECISIVE POINTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, WHERE WE SEE IT HELPFUL TO MOVE THINGS FORWARD, WE GIVE OUR OWN IDEAS. THAT WAS THE WAY THE AGENDA FOR THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE MEETING IN JERUSALEM WAS RESOLVED LAST JANUARY--OUR PROPOSAL BROKE THE IMPASSE.

--THAT MAY OCCUR AGAIN, THOUGH NO DECISION HAS BEEN MADE ON HOW OR WHEN WE MIGHT PUT FORWARD FURTHER U.S. SUGGESTIONS.

--THOUGH NEXT STEPS IN THIS PROCESS ARE UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDERATION, WHAT THEY ARE AND THEIR TIMING DEPEND STILL UPON THE CONTINUING CONTACTS WITH ISRAEL AND EGYPT

PANAMA

Q: WHY IS THE PRESIDENT GOING TO PANAMA NOW WHEN THE TREATIES CANNOT TAKE EFFECT UNTIL NEXT APRIL ACCORDING TO THE BROOKE RESERVATION ADOPTED BY THE SENATE? ALSO, DOESN'T THE WELCOME LAST SATURDAY RECEIVED BY ANNULFO ARIAS, WHOM TORRIJOS DEPOSED IN 1968, SUGGEST THAT THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT RUNS COUNTER TO THE WISHES OF THE PANAMANIAN PEOPLE? FINALLY, WHY IS THE PRESIDENT GOING TO PANAMA WHEN IT HAS REPUDIATED, AS SENATOR HELMS SAID LAST

WEEK, THE SENATE'S ACTION ON THE TREATIES?

A: --THE VISIT IS TO DELIVER AND RECEIVE THE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION APPROVED BY BOTH COUNTRIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES. IT WILL GIVE BINDING EFFECT TO THE TREATIES WE HAVE CONCLUDED WITH PANAMA ON THE CANAL.

.-OUR INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION WILL CONTAIN ALL OF THE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
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AMENDMENTS, RESERVATIONS, CONDITIONS AND UNDERSTANDINGS ADOPTED BY THE SENATE.

--OBVIOUSLY, THIS EVENT COULD NOT TAKE PLACE WITHOUT PANAMA'S ACCEPTANCE OF ALL OF THESE. WE HAVE CONSULTED THE SENATE LEADERSHIP AND THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE WITH RESPECT TO THESE INSTRUMENTS. A NUMBER OF SENATORS WILL ACCOMPANY HIM FOR THIS EVENT.

--THE EFFECTIVE DATE FOR THE EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS WILL BE APRIL 1, 1979 UNLESS THE CONGRESS PASSES IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION BEFORE THEN. THIS KEEPS FAITH WITH THE TIME-TABLE SET BY THE SENATE. THE CONGRESS, THEREFORE, SHOULD HAVE AMPLE TIME TO ENACT THE NECESSARY LEGISLATION PRIOR TO OCTOBER 1 OF NEXT YEAR WHEN THE TREATIES WILL ENTER INTO FORCE.

--THE BREVITY AND CEREMONIAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT WILL PROBABLY PRECLUDE HIS MEETING WITH MR. ARIAS. WE ARE IMPRESSED BY THE POLITICAL FREEDOM WHICH THE EVENTS SURROUNDING HIS ARRIVAL IN PANAMA DEMONSTRATE. OTHERS WITH THE PRESIDENT MAY MEET WITH PANAMANIAN LEADERS FROM VARIOUS SECTORS OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT.

VIETNAM -- NORMALIZATION PROCESS

Q: WHERE DO WE STAND IN OUR RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM RIGHT NOW? HOW HAVE RECENT EVENTS--SUCH AS THE HUMPHREY-TRUONG ESPIONAGE TRIAL--AFFECTED THE NORMALIZATION PROCESS?

A: --OBVIOUSLY THE EVENTS WHICH LED TO THE TRIAL OF RONALD HUMPHREY AND DAVID TRUONG, INCLUDING THE EXCLUSION OF THE VIETNAMESE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
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DINH BA THI, CANNOT BE HELPFUL IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. BUT WE HOPE THAT THESE EVENTS WILL NOT IMPEDE OUR

RELATIONS IN SUCH A WAY AS TO PRECLUDE OUR MOVING FORWARD WITH NORMALIZATION TALKS.

--OUR POSITION CONTINUES TO BE THAT NORMALIZATION SHOULD BE ACHIEVED ON THE BASIS OF FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND THE EXCHANGE OF EMBASSIES WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. ONCE EMBASSIES ARE IN PLACE, WE WOULD LIFT THE TRADE AND INVESTMENT EMBARGO.

ARMS SALES TO CHINA

Q: THE PRESIDENT HAS REPORTEDLY STATED THAT THE US WILL RAISE NO OBJECTION TO ARMS SALES TO CHINA BY THIRD COUNTRIES.

IS THAT REPORT ACCURATE--IS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION?

A: --OUR POLICY ON US ARMS SALES TO CHINA IS CLEAR. WE ARE NOT GOING TO SELL ARMS TO THE PRC. ARMS SALES BY THIRD COUNTRIES FALL PRIMARILY WITHIN THE DOMAIN OF THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED. HOWEVER, WE DO HAVE LEGITIMATE CONCERNS WITH ANY SALES. FIRST, THAT THEY NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT OUR OWN SECURITY OR THAT OF OUR ALLIES IN EAST ASIA OR HAVE A DESTABILIZING EFFECT IN THAT REGION. AND SECOND, THAT ANY SUCH SALES DO NOT ADVERSELY EFFECT THE MAINTENANCE OF THE COCOM SYSTEM.

Q: HAVE YOU IN FACT "GIVEN THE NOD" TO FRENCH SALES OF THE HOT ANTI-TANK MISSILE:

A: I AM NOT PREPARED TO COMMENT ON ANY SPECIFIC OR HYPOTHETICAL SALE BY A THIRD COUNTRY. I WILL STAND ON MY COMMENTS ABOVE. CHRISTOPHER

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QUOTE: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 150993 TOS  
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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: OVIP (VANCE, CYRUS)

SUBJECT: Q'S AND A'S FOR SECRETARY'S LONDON PRESS  
CONFERENCE

THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ARE FOR USE IN THE  
SECRETARY'S LONDON PRESS CONFERENCE ON JUNE 16:

Q. THE PRESIDENT'S ANNAPOLIS SPEECH HAS BEEN CRITICIZED  
FOR NOT DOING WHAT IT WAS SUPPOSED TO DO -- CLARIFY  
THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY TOWARDS THE USSR. HOW DO  
YOU REACT TO THOSE CRITICISMS? CAN YOU FURTHER  
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CLARIFY OUR POLICY?

A. I THINK THE PROBLEM IS NOT ONE OF CONTRADICTIONS IN  
OUR POLICY, BUT OF CONTRADICTIONS IN THE US-SOVIET  
RELATIONSHIP. LET ME BRIEFLY RECAPITULATE THE MAIN POINTS  
OF THE SPEECH. WHILE THE US-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP IS A  
COMPETITIVE ONE, THE US IS COMMITTED TO SEEKING IMPROVEMENT  
IN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND TO REDUCING  
TENSIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, CERTAIN TYPES OF BEHAVIOR BY  
THE SOVIET UNION ARE NOT CONTRIBUTING TO THAT PROCESS AND  
ARE THREATENING TO UNDERMINE PUBLIC SUPPORT IN THE US FOR  
SUCH A POLICY. IN OUR OWN SELF-INTEREST WE REMAIN

COMMITTED TO NEGOTIATING A FAIR SALT AGREEMENT. WE HAVE  
NO DESIRE TO LINK SALT WITH OTHER ISSUES IN OUR RELATION-  
SHIP, BUT WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT TENSIONS AND DISPUTES  
CAN COMPLICATE OUR EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT AN AGREEMENT.

THERE ARE NO SIGNIFICANT DISAGREEMENTS WITHIN THIS  
ADMINISTRATION ON OUR POLICY TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION.  
OBVIOUSLY, THERE MAY BE DIFFERENCE IN NUANCE ON CERTAIN

ISSUES, BUT THE POLICY OUTLINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH REPRESENTS A UNIFIED VIEW, NOT A COMPROMISE OF DIFFERING VIEWS.

I REEMPHASIZE THAT WE ARE COMMITTED TO SEEKING AN IMPROVEMENT IN US-SOVIET RELATIONS, TO BUILDING ON AND WIDENING THE COOPERATIVE ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP, AND TO NARROWING DIFFERENCES WHICH EXIST BETWEEN US. TO THE EXTENT THE SOVIET UNION SHARES THESE GOALS AND ACTS ACCORDINGLY, US-SOVIET RELATIONS CAN MOVE FORWARD.

Q. CAN YOU CONFIRM THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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CONDUCTING INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION, INCLUDING THE USE OF FATAL POISONS?

A. I AM FAMILIAR WITH THE RECENT ALLEGATIONS IN THE SOVIET PRESS, BUT I DON'T INTEND TO DISCUSS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

SOV/HUMAN RIGHTS

Q. HAS THE ADMINISTRATION'S STAND ON HUMAN RIGHTS HAD ANY APPARENT EFFECT ON SOVIET POLICIES IN THIS AREA?

A. WE BELIEVE THE ADMINISTRATION'S HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY HAS HAD THE EFFECT OF RAISING THE CONSCIOUSNESS, AND INCREASING THE AWARENESS OF THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUALS AROUND THE WORLD. SOVIET DISSIDENTS GENERALLY HAVE WELCOMED THE AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THEIR CAUSE WHICH THEY ASSOCIATE WITH PRESIDENT CARTER. THEY KNOW, HOWEVER, THAT THERE IS LITTLE BEYOND WHAT WE HAVE DONE ALREADY THAT WE CAN DO TO HELP THEM DIRECTLY. IF WE CONSISTENTLY AND PERSISTENTLY PROMOTE RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, WE BELIEVE THIS CAN HAVE A POSITIVE EFFECT ON THE POLICIES OF COUNTRIES WHERE THERE ARE HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS, INCLUDING THE USSR.

WITHOUT TAKING ANY CREDIT, WE NOTE RECENT IMPROVEMENTS IN HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES INCLUDING PARAGUAY, CHILE, INDONESIA, AND KOREA. IT IS A MIXED PICTURE TO BE SURE, BUT WE THINK IT IS MORE POSITIVE THAN NEGATIVE.

Q. WHAT IS THE ADMINISTRATION'S VIEW OF "EURO-COMMUNISM"?

A. -- THIS TERM USUALLY REFERS TO THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF FRANCE, ITALY, AND SPAIN. EACH IS DIFFERENT IN ITS HISTORY AND COMPOSITION; IN ITS DOMESTIC POLITICAL

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SITUATION; IN THE DEFENSE OF ITS ALLEGED INDEPENDENCE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES; AND IN THE HARMONY OF ITS PROFESSED VIEWS WITH THOSE OF OTHER WEST EUROPEAN PARTIES.

-- WE UNDERSTAND THOSE DIFFERENCES. BUT THE BEHAVIOR AND DECLARED POSITIONS OF EACH OF THEM STILL GIVES US REASON FOR CONCERN ABOUT HOW ITS BEHAVIOR IN GOVERNMENT WOULD AFFECT THE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRY CONCERNED, AND THAT COUNTRY'S ABILITY TO COOPERATE ON A RANGE OF ISSUES NOT ONLY WITH US, BUT WITH ITS WEST EUROPEAN PARTNERS.

-- WE RECOGNIZE THAT EACH COUNTRY MUST AND SHOULD MAKE ITS OWN POLITICAL CHOICES, AND WE DON'T WANT TO INTERFERE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF ANOTHER DEMOCRACY. AT THE SAME TIME, WE DO NOT WANT OUR NON-INTERFERENCE TO BE READ AS INDIFFERENCE, OR AS A SIGNAL THAT OUR DOUBTS ABOUT

THESE PARTIES HAD BEEN RESOLVED. THE ITALIAN PARTY IN PARTICULAR HAS TRIED TO USE OUR STANCE OF NON-INTERVENTION AS A SIGN OF "ACCEPTANCE", IN ORDER TO FURTHER ITS QUEST FOR LEGITIMACY. FOR THAT REASON, WE MADE CLEAR LAST JANUARY OUR DOUBTS ABOUT THESE PARTIES AND OUR HOPE THAT THEIR INFLUENCE WOULD NOT GROW, AND MIGHT BE REDUCED.

-- THE BEST WAY TO COMBAT THE COMMUNIST CHALLENGE IS OF COURSE FOR NON-COMMUNIST PARTIES TO BE RESPONSIVE TO THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC NEEDS OF THEIR PEOPLE.

ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: EUROPE

Q. THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK IN EUROPE IS NOT VERY ENCOURAGING.  
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DO YOU EXPECT THE JULY ECONOMIC SUMMIT IN BONN OT HAVE ANY IMPACT ON THAT RATHER BLEAK SITUATION?

A. WHILE WE STILL FACE SERIOUS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, THE SITUATION IS PERHAPS NOT AS BLEAK AS THE QUESTION WOULD IMPLY. INFLATION HAS BEEN BROUGHT DOWN DRAMATICALLY COMPARED WITH 1975, REAL OUTPUT IS UP, AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS POSITIONS OF SEVERAL COUNTRIES HAVE IMPROVED. MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE, HOWEVER. THE OECD MINISTERIAL,

THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL IN BREMEN, AND THE BONN SUMMIT WILL ALL SERVE TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON CURRENT ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, AND ON WHAT EACH COUNTRY CAN AND SHOULD DO SO THAT, BY WORKING TOGETHER, WE MAY IMPROVE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS FOR ALL. WE SHOULD GO INTO THE BONN SUMMIT WITH A GOOD IDEA OF THE PRESENT STATE OF THE WORLD ECONOMY AND WITH A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE SUCCESS OF OUR ENDEAVORS WILL DEPEND ON EACH COUNTRY DOING ITS PART TO ACHIEVE CONCERTED ACTION INVOLVING TRADE LIBERALIZATION, EFFORTS TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC GROWTH AND REDUCE INFLATION, THE REDUCTION OF DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN ENERGY, AND AGREEMENT FOR CRITERIA FOR POSITIVE ADJUSTMENT POLICIES TO PHASE OUT OBSOLETE CAPACITY.

NATO

Q. NATO LEADERS MET IN WASHINGTON AT THE END OF LAST MONTH. DID THAT MEETING HAVE ANY REAL-SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE FUTURE OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE?

A. -- THE PRINCIPAL REASON FOR THE SUMMIT WAS TO REVIEW THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY CHALLENGES THAT WILL FACE THE ALLIES IN THE NEXT DECADE AND TO TAKE NECESSARY STEPS TO MEET THOSE CHALLENGES. THE CENTRAL

OBJECTIVE OF THE SUMMIT WAS TO FOLLOW THROUGH ON THE INITIATIVES ADOPTED BY THE ALLIES AT THE LONDON SUMMIT IN LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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MAY 1977: THE EAST-WEST STUDY, THE LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM (LTDP), AND IMPROVED NATO ARMAMENTS COOPERATION.

-- THE ALLIES DISCUSSED HOW THE ALLIANCE SHOULD COPE WITH THE CONTINUING EXCESSIVE BUILD-UP OF WARSAW PACT FORCES IN EUROPE AND WITH THE INCREASING PROJECTION OF SOVIET POWER OUTSIDE EUROPE.

-- THE ALLIES DECIDED THAT THE MAINTENANCE OF UNDIMINISHED AND, IF POSSIBLE, IMPROVED SECURITY AT LOWER LEVELS OF ARMAMENTS AND ARMED FORCES MUST BE A CONSTANT AIM.

-- THE ALLIES AGREED THAT NATO MUST TAKE NECESSARY STEPS TO MAINTAIN A CREDIBLE DETERRENT AND DEFENSE POSTURE, WHILE CONTINUING TO SUPPORT THE CONCEPT OF FORWARD DEFENSE BASED ON ADEQUATE CONVENTIONAL, THEATRE NUCLEAR AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES THROUGH THE 1980'S.

-- TO FULFULL THESE OBJECTIVES, THE ALLIES ADOPTED A LTDP. IT MARKS A SIGNIFICANT MILESTONE FOR NATO THROUGH ITS PROJECTIONS OF ALLIANCE DEFENSE PLANNING INTO A LONG-TERM

FRAMEWORK AND ITS EMPHASIS ON MUCH CLOSER COORDINATION IN NATO DEFENSE PLANNING.

-- THE PARTICIPATING ALLIES, IN APPROVING THE LTDP AS A COURSE OF ACTION, PLEDGED THEIR FULL SUPPORT FOR THE INTENSIVE CIVIL AND MILITARY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS NEEDED AT NATIONAL AND NATO LEVELS TO INSURE THE VIGOROUS AND SUSTAINED FOLLOW-THROUGH THAT WILL BE NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE THE LTDP'S PURPOSE.

MBFR

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Q. WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE TALKS ON MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE?

A. THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE MOVEMENT IN THE MBFR TALKS SINCE THEY BEGAN FIVE YEARS AGO. WE AND OUR ALLIES TOOK A MAJOR STEP IN APRIL, TABLING A NEW INITIATIVE THAT WE HOPE WILL LEAD TO PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE WARSAW PACT PARTICIPANTS HAVE NOW MADE NEW PROPOSALS IN VIENNA. THE NEGOTIATING POSITIONS OF THE TWO SIDES DIFFER SUBSTANTIALLY ON A NUMBER OF ESSENTIAL POINTS, AND IT IS NOT YET CLEAR THAT THE WAY IS OPEN TO MOVE TOWARD AN AGREEMENT THAT RESULTS IN REAL PARITY AND INCREASES STABILITY IN

IN EUROPE. BUT ANY MOVE THAT MAY INDICATE THAT THE LEADERS OF THE SOVIET UNION, AND OTHER WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES, WANT TO MOVE INTO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT SECURITY IN EUROPE WILL BE WELCOMED BY THIS ADMINISTRATION. WE AND OUR ALLIES WILL STUDY THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSALS CAREFULLY.

Q. HOW DO SOVIET ACTIONS IN AFRICA SQUARE WITH THIS ADMINISTRATION'S VIEWS OF DETENTE?

A. AS THE PRESIDENT SAID IN ANNAPOLIS, SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA, PARTICULARLY THEIR MILITARY INTERVENTION IN LOCAL CONFLICTS, IS OF SERIOUS CONCERN TO THIS ADMINISTRATION. PRESENTLY, AFRICA IS ONE OF THE AREAS OF COMPETITION IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS.

-- THE PERSISTENT INCREASE OF SOVIET-CUBAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT COULD DENY THE VISION WE HAVE FOR AFRICA, ONE OF A CONTINENT FREE OF OUTSIDE INTERVENTION, RACIAL BITTERNESS, CONFLICT, AND THE BURDENS OF HUNGER, POVERTY AND DISEASE.

-- WE LOOK FORWARD TO A RAPID, COMPREHENSIVE AND

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PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT TO THE PROBLEMS OF ACHIEVING MAJORITY RULE IN RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA. WE BELIEVE THAT ONLY A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND SOMALIA WHICH PROTECTS THE RIGHTS OF ETHNIC SOMALIS IN THE OGADEN CAN PROVIDE A LASTING SOLUTION TO THAT CONFLICT. FURTHER, WE SUPPORT EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS TO CONFLICTS IN ERITREA AND ANGOLA.

-- WE CALL UPON THE SOVIET UNION TO CEASE ITS POLICY OF ARMED INTERVENTION AND TO JOIN WITH US IN ASSISTING AFRICAN NATIONS TO SEEK TRULY LASTING SOLUTIONS TO THEIR PROBLEMS.

Q: THE ADMINISTRATION SEEMS TO SPEAK WITH MANY VOICES ON AFRICA. THERE IS AN APPARENT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND WHITE HOUSE ON HOW STRONGLY WE SHOULD CONFRONT THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS IN AFRICA. WHAT IS THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S POSITION ON THIS POINT?

A: THE IDEA OF A "SPLIT" BETWEEN THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND WHITE HOUSE MAKES FOR INTERESTING READING AND HAS ADDED ZEST TO A NUMBER OF PRESS STORIES. THE ASSUMPTION IS QUITE WIDE OF THE MARK.

I THINK THE BEST WAY TO RESPOND IS TO LOOK AT THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY AS IT HAS ACTUALLY EMERGED. THERE IS NO DISAGREEMENT ON OUR VIEW OF THE EVENTS IN THE HORN. THERE WAS NO DIFFERENCE OF OPINION ON THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO ASSIST IN A LIMITED FASHION THE EFFORT TO EVACUATE FOREIGN NATIONALS FROM SHABA PROVINCE. THERE IS AGREEMENT THAT WE SHOULD, IN A MEASURED AND CLEARLY LIMITED WAY, PROVIDE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO UNITS OF AFRICAN TROOPS WHICH ARE NOW GOING TO SHABA TO INSURE ITS SECURITY AND THEREBY PROTECT ITS ECONOMIC VIABILITY. THERE IS NO LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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DIFFERENCE OF OPINION ON OUR SOUTHERN AFRICA POLICY. AS OUR POLICIES ARE FORMULATED, THERE ARE UNDERSTANDABLY SOME DIFFERENCES IN EMPHASIS. THESE ARE TO BE EXPECTED AND HEALTHY.

Q: THERE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN A CLEAR SHIFT IN OUR AFRICA POLICY FROM AN EMPHASIS ON DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATION TO A SHARPER CONFRONTATION WITH THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS. IS THIS TRUE?

A: I THINK IF WE COMPARE THE FUNDAMENTAL POINTS OF OUR POLICY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE ADMINISTRATION AND TODAY, IT IS CLEAR THAT THOSE FUNDAMENTALS REMAIN THE SAME. WE ARE CERTAINLY NOT SEEKING WAYS TO CONFRONT THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS. IF OUR RESTRAINT IS NOT MET BY A SIMILAR ATTITUDE BY THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS, WE MAY NEED TO CONSIDER ACTIONS WHICH ARE DIFFERENT IN SOME DEGREE. THE POINT, HOWEVER, IS THAT THESE WILL STILL BE GUIDED BY AN ATTITUDE OF RESTRAINT; THEY WILL BE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED, LIMITED AND DIRECTED AT WHAT IS BEST FOR THE UNITED STATES AND FOR AFRICA -- NOT AT WHAT IS LIKELY TO CAUSE THE GREATEST DISCOMFORT FOR THE SOVIET UNION OR CUBA.

Q: THERE IS A CONTRADICTION BETWEEN WHAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAS SAID AND WHAT FIDEL CASTRO HAS SAID REGARDING WHETHER OR NOT CASTRO ATTEMPTED TO DISSUADE THE ANGOLANS FROM PERMITTING KATANGESE REBELS TO LAUNCH AN ATTACK ON

ZAIRE FROM INSIDE ANGOLA. WOULD YOU CARE TO COMMENT?

A: FIDEL CASTRO TOLD OUR INTERESTS SECTION THAT HE HAD WARNED THE NETO GOVERNMENT A MONTH BEFORE THE ATTACK THAT HE HAD REPORTS THE KATANGESE WERE PREPARING TO INVADE SHABA PROVINCE. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT HE THEREFORE HAD SUBSTANTIAL FOREKNOWLEDGE THAT AN ATTACK WAS PLANNED. THE CUBANS HAVE GREAT INFLUENCE WITH THE ANGOLAN LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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GOVERNMENT AND PRESUMABLY WITH THE KATANGESE WHOM THEY TRAINED.

YET THE ATTACK TOOK PLACE.

WE THEREFORE CONCLUDE THAT OBVIOUSLY NOTHING WAS DONE TO PREVENT IT.

Q: WHAT SPECIFICALLY ARE YOU DOING TO COUNTER SOVIET AND CUBAN MEDDLING IN AFRICA?

A: IN OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND IN OUR PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS AND THE CUBANS WE HAVE MADE KNOWN OUR SERIOUS AND DEEP CONCERN WITH SOVIET AND CUBAN ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA.

WE HAVE TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT THEIR CONTINUED ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA POSE A DANGER TO OUR OVERALL RELATIONS. WE HAVE SOUGHT THE SUPPORT OF OTHER NATIONS WHO SHARE OUR CONCERN TO URGE RESTRAINT ON THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS. WE WILL CONSIDER SYMPATHETICALLY REQUESTS FOR ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM THOSE AFRICAN NATIONS WHO HAVE LEGITIMATE SECURITY NEEDS AND ARE FACED WITH A BUILDUP OF CUBAN TROOPS AND SOVIET ARMS ON THEIR BORDER.

WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK FOR THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS IN AFRICA. IN DOING SO, WE DENY THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS A PRETEXT FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION.

Q: HAS THE US MADE A COMMITMENT TO AN AFRICAN FORCE?

A: WE HAVE NOT UNDERTAKEN ANY COMMITMENT FOR THE CREATION OR SUPPORT OF A GENERAL PAN-AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE. OUR ACTIONS HAVE BEEN EXCLUSIVELY FOCUSED ON THE SECURITY NEEDS OF SHABA PROVINCE. IN ANY CASE, ANY SUCH FORCE SHOULD BE CREATED BY THE AFRICANS THEMSELVES, PRESUMABLY UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE OAU.  
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AFRICAN TROOPS IN SHABA ARE THEREAT THE REQUEST OF ZAIRE AND IN RESPONSE TO AN APPEAL FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY. AT THE REQUEST OF THE GOVERNMENTS INVOLVED, FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE PROVIDED LOGISTICAL SUPPORT. THE US ROLE IS LIMITED TO AN AIRLIFT, PRIMARILY OF HEAVY EQUIPMENT FOR WHICH WE HAVE A UNIQUE CAPABILITY. I HAVE AUTHORIZED A LIMITED NUMBER

OF MISSIONS TO MOVE AFRICAN TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT INTO ZAIRE TO COINCIDE WITH THE RETURN OF FRENCH LEGIONAIRES TO FRANCE.

Q: WHAT COMMITMENTS TO ZAIRE HAVE BEEN MADE IN THE PARIS AND BRUSSELS MEETINGS?

A: THE PARIS MEETING FOCUSED ON THE INTERTWINED ECONOMIC AND SECURITY PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE INVASION OF SHABA. A WIDE RANGE OF ISSUES WERE DISCUSSED INCLUDING SUPPORT FOR THE AFRICAN FORCES PRESENTLY BEING DEPLOYED IN SHABA. WE MADE NO COMMITMENTS, BUT GENERALLY AGREED THAT A JOINT, COORDINATED RESPONSE WOULD BE REQUIRED TO SOLVE ZAIRE'S PROBLEMS.

AT THE BRUSSELS MEETING WE WILL LISTEN TO EXPLANATIONS OF THE "MOBUTU PLAN" WHICH IS A ZAIRIAN PROPOSAL FOR A THREE YEAR STRATEGY OF ECONOMIC STABILIZATION. WE SEEK DETAILED AND SPECIFIC INFORMATION WHICH WILL AID IN OUR EVALUATION CONCERNING THE POSSIBILITY OF ADDITIONAL AMERICAN ASSISTANCE. SHOULD WE DECIDE TO PROCEED WITH SOME ADDITIONAL AID WE WOULD SEEK TO COORDINATE OUR ASSISTANCE SO THAT IT WOULD WELL AND EFFECTIVELY RESPOND TO ZAIRE'S NEEDS. IN THIS CONTEXT WE REQUIRE ASSURANCES THAT FUNDAMENTAL REFORM BE A REQUISITE PART OF ANY ASSISTANCE PACKAGE.

Q: CAN YOU BRING US UP-TO-DATE ON ANGOLA-AMERICAN EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT A SETTLEMENT OF THE RHODESIA PROBLEM?



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A: JOHN GRAHAM OF THE BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE AND STEPHEN LOW, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO ZAMBIA ARE IN SALISBURY THIS WEEK WHERE THEY ARE HOLDING DISCUSSIONS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND OTHERS WHO REPRESENT POLITICAL VIEWPOINTS WITHIN RHODESIA.

IN THESE DISCUSSIONS, MR. GRAHAM AND AMBASSADOR LOW ARE SEEKING WAYS TO NARROW THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PARTIES IN ORDER TO PAVE THE WAY FOR AN ALL-PARTIES MEETING. AFTER LEAVING SALISBURY, MR. GRAHAM AND AMBASSADOR LOW PLAN TO VISIT CERTAIN FRONT-LINE STATES FOR MEETINGS WITH HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. -THE SCHEDULE FOR THESE MEETINGS HAS NOT YET BEEN FIRMLY SET.

Q: WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE WESTERN CONTACT GROUP'S PROPOSALS FOR NAMIBIA?

A: WE ARE ENCOURAGED BY REPORTS WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM THE WEEKEND SUMMIT ON NAMIBIA HELD BY THE FRONT-LINE IN LUANDA THAT SWAPO HAS AGREED TO MEET AGAIN WITH THE

CONTACT GROUP.

IN THE DAYS AHEAD WE WILL BE DISCUSSING WITH OUR WESTERN PARTNERS AND WITH THE OTHER CONCERNED PARTIES THE NEXT STEPS TO BE TAKEN.

Q. WHAT IS THE CURRENT SITUATION IN ERITREA?

A. IN MID-MAY, BOTH THE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE ERITREAN MOVEMENTS MADE STATEMENTS SUGGESTING THAT A MAJOR ETHIOPIAN OFFENSIVE HAD BEEN LAUNCHED IN ERITREA. WE DO NOT HAVE COMPLETE INFORMATION ON THE SITUATION, BUT OUR BEST ESTIMATE NOW IS THAT, WHILE THERE HAS BEEN LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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SOME INCREASE IN THE PACE OF THE FIGHTING IN RECENT WEEKS, THIS IS ESSENTIALLY A CONTINUATION OF WHAT WAS ALREADY GOING ON -- FIGHTING AROUND ASMARA AND ONE OR TWO OF THE OTHER CITIES IN THE REGION BETWEEN THE ETHIOPIAN FORCES OCCUPYING THE CITIES AND THE REBEL FORCES IN THE HINTERLAND -- AND THAT THE ETHIOPIANS HAVE NOT YET LAUNCHED THE KIND OF CONCERTED OFFENSIVE THAT HAS BEEN WIDELY PREDICTED FOLLOWING THEIR BUILDUP OF FORCES IN ERITREA. THE BUILDUP, HOWEVER, IS CONTINUING.

Q. ARE THE CUBANS AND SOVIETS GETTING INVOLVED IN THE FIGHTING IN ERITREA?

A. OUR LATEST INFORMATION INDICATES THAT THERE ARE NO CUBAN COMBAT UNITS IN ERITREA. THERE ARE CUBAN ADVISORY AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL, AND THERE HAVE BEEN SOME INDICATIONS THAT CUBAN PILOTS MAY HAVE FLOWN SOME MISSIONS.

Q. WHAT IS OUR POLICY TOWARD ERITREA?

A. WE BELIEVE THAT THE ERITREAN SITUATION SHOULD BE RESOLVED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE ERITREAN MOVEMENTS AND THE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THIS PROBLEM IS SUSCEPTIBLE TO MILITARY RESOLUTION. WHILE THE ULTIMATE OUTCOME IS FOR THE PARTICIPANTS TO DETERMINE, WE BELIEVE THAT A SOLUTION COULD BE BASED ON SOME FORM OF ERITREAN AUTONOMY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF ETHIOPIAN SOVEREIGNTY.

TURKISH ARMS EMBARGO

Q. WHY DOES THIS ADMINISTRATION FEEL REPEAL OF THE TURKISH ARMS EMBARGO IS NECESSARY? WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS FOR LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO?

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A. -- THE ADMINISTRATION HAS PROPOSED THE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO BECAUSE OF ITS STRONG CONVICTION THAT THE ARMS RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED ON TURKEY IN EARLY 1975 HAVE CLEARLY OUTLIVED THEIR USEFULNESS. THE EMBARGO HAS NOT PROMPTED A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT, AND IS PARTLY RESPONSIBLE

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FOR A DETERIORATION IN TURKEY'S MILITARY POSITION WHICH IS DAMAGING TO U.S. AND NATO INTERESTS. A NEW COURSE OF ACTION SEEMS REQUIRED TO: (A) SAFEGUARD U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, (B) IMPROVE PROSPECTS FOR BETTER RELATIONS WITH GREECE AND TURKEY, AND (C) FACILITATE PROGRESS TOWARD A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT.

-- WE HAVE DETECTED CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT FOR THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSALS AND WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT A MAJORITY IN BOTH HOUSES OF THE CONGRESS WILL ACT TO REPEAL THE RESTRICTIONS ON ARMS SHIPMENTS TO TURKEY.

CYPRUS

Q. WHAT IS THE OUTLOOK FOR A SETTLEMENT OF THE CYPRUS SITUATION?

A. -- WE BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A GOOD LIKELIHOOD THAT PROGRESS CAN BE MADE TOWARDS A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT IF AND WHEN THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS ARE RESUMED. BOTH SIDES HAVE NOW PUT FORWARD CONCRETE AND SUBSTANTIAL PROPOSALS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND TERRITORIAL ISSUES WHICH CAN SERVE AS A STARTING-POINT FOR A PRODUCTIVE DIALOGUE. MOREOVER, IN CONTRAST TO PAST POSITIONS, LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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THE GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY AND THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS HAVE GIVEN EXPLICIT ASSURANCES THAT THEY INTEND TO BE VERY FORTHCOMING AND TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH.

-- THE CURRENT PROBLEM, THEN, IS TO PERSUADE THE PARTIES TO RETURN TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. REALISTICALLY SPEAKING, THIS MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE UNTIL THE ISSUE OF THE TURKISH ARMS EMBARGO HAS BEEN DECIDED ONE WAY OR THE OTHER.

CHINA - NORMALIZATION SCHEDULE

Q. THERE WERE JAPANESE PRESS REPORTS OVER THE WEEKEND THAT SINO-U.S. RELATIONS WILL BE FORMALIZED EARLY NEXT YEAR- THERE STORIES ALSO MAINTAINED THAT THE U.S. HAS AGREED TO ACCEPT PEKING'S THREE CONDITIONS FOR NORMALIZATION. CAN YOU CONFIRM THESE REPORTS?

A. -- OUR POLICY ON RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IS BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE OF 1972. WE HAVE REPEATEDLY STATED THAT THE GOAL OF OUR EFFORTS IS THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH CHINA.

-- AT THE SAME TIME, WE HAVE CONSTANTLY OBSERVED THAT NO DEADLINE OR SCHEDULE HAS BEEN AFFIXED TO COMPLETION OF THIS NORMALIZATION PROCESS.

Q. BUT SOME PEOPLE SEE IN THE DAEDALUS SALE OF EQUIPMENT TO PEKING AND IN DR. BRZEZINSKI'S RECENT TRIP THERE INDICATIONS OF A U.S. ACCELERATION TOWARDS NORMALIZATION. IS THIS A VALID INTERPRETATION?

A. -- NO. OUR EXPORT LICENSING DECISIONS ARE BASED UPON THE TECHNICAL MERITS OF EACH CASE IN TERMS OF ITS POTENTIAL EFFECT ON OUR SECURITY AND THAT OF OUR ALLIES.

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WE HAVE ALREADY POINTED OUT THAT DR. BRZEZINSKI'S VISIT TO CHINA WAS IN LINE WITH THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE WHICH CONTEMPLATED SUCH MEETINGS.

-- AS I SAID BEFORE, OUR GOAL IS NORMATION OF RELATIONS WITH CHINA ALONG THE PRINCIPLES OF THE SHANGHAI CO;MUNIQUE, BUT I CANNOT GIVE ANY SPECIFICS OF THE PROCESS AS TO TIMING OR THE MODALITIES INVOLVED.

KOREA - HOUSE RESOLUTION

Q. WHAT IS YOUR REACTION TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES' ADOPTION OF A RESOLUTION THREATENING TO DENY OR REDUCE NON-MILITARY FUNDS FOR THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA UNLESS SOME US-ROK AGREEMENT IS REACHED ON OBTAINING EVIDENCE FROM FORMER AMBASSADOR KIM DONG JO ABOUT "KOREAGATE?"

A. -- AS WE HAVE SAID, WE SHARE THE DESIRE OF THE CONGRESS TO BRING THE PRESENT INVESTIGATION TO A SATISFACTORY CONCLUSION AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. I WILL CONTINUE IN EVERY APPROPRIATE WAY TO FACILITATE THOSE EFFORTS.

-- HOWEVER, WE VERY MUCH REGRET THAT THE RESOLUTION WAS PASSED BY THE HOUSE. THE USE OF IMPLIED PRESSURE AND SANCTIONS TO COMPEL A SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT TO WAIVE ITS RIGHTS UNDER THE VIENNA CONVENTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES IS, IN MY JUDGMENT, CONTRARY TO THE CONVENTION.

TAIWAN - U.S. ARMS SALES

Q. WHAT IS YOUR REACTION TO WEEKEND NEWS REPORTS THAT

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THE UNITED STATES IS CONSIDERING SELLING THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 60 F-4 FIGHTER-BOMBERS?

A. -- WE HAVE A NUMBER OF DIFFERENT REQUESTS FROM THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, AND THESE ARE ALL UNDER CONSIDERATION.

-- HOWEVER, I AM NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS ANY OF THE SPECIFICS OF THESE REQUESTS.

CURRENT STATUS OF MIDDLE EAST PEACE EFFORTS

Q: WHERE DO MIDDLE EAST PEACE EFFORTS NOW STAND?

A: --THE PEACE-MAKING PROCESS HAS BEEN AND REMAINS THE CENTRAL FOCUS OF AMERICAN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

--ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT EXPECT INSTANT SOLUTIONS, WE BELIEVE THE STAGE HAS BEEN SET FOR MOVEMENT FORWARD, AND WE ARE CONTINUING OUR INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS WITH BOTH ISRAEL AND EGYPT TO THAT END.

--THE FOCAL POINT OF THESE CONSULTATIONS AT PRESENT IS THE ISSUE OF THE FUTURE OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AND THE ROLE OF THE PALESTINIANS IN RESOLVING THIS QUESTION. IT IS NOW THE KEY TO PROGRESS, AND WE ARE AWAITING ANSWERS FROM THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TO THE QUESTIONS WE POSED ON THIS SUBJECT. AS YOU KNOW, THE ISRAELI CABINET HAS BEEN DISCUSSING THESE QUESTIONS AT ITS LAST TWO CABINET MEETINGS AND WE UNDERSTAND IT WILL CONTINUE DELIBERATION ON THEM IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

--FROM THE OUTSET LAST DECEMBER WE SAID THAT THE PLAN PRIME MINISTER BEGIN PUT FORWARD ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WAS A CONSTRUCTIVE STARTING POINT FOR NEGOTIATIONS. WE ARE NOW SEEKING CONCRETE WAYS TO MOVE THOSE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD.

--WE ARE ALSO EXPLORING WITH PRESIDENT SADAT HOW HE MIGHT CONTRIBUTE HIS OWN IDEAS TO FINDING A WAY OUT OF THE CURRENT LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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IMPASSE OVER THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE. AMBASSADOR ELITS, WHO HAS HAD LONG TALKS WITH PRESIDENT SADAT AND FOREIGN MINISTER KAMEL IN THE PAST FEW WEEKS, HAS JUST BEEN HERE FOR CONSULTATIONS.

--OUR ROLE IS TO HELP THE PARTIES FIND A MIDDLE GROUND. THAT MEANS HELPING THEM FIND A FORMULA WHEREBY A PRACTICAL SOLUTION FOR THE FUTURE OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA CAN BE NEGOTIATED WITHIN THE TERMS OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242.

--OUR VIEW IS THAT THE ISSUES OF SECURITY AND OF THE FINAL STATUS OF THESE TERRITORIES CAN BE SEPARATED--AS ISRAEL HAS ALREADY AGREED TO DO IN ITS PROPOSAL TO EGYPT ON THE SINAI. THIS WOULD PROVIDE A PRACTICAL BASIS TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD.

--WE BELIEVE THAT THE PRINCIPLES OF RESOLUTION 242, INCLUDING THE PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL, MUST APPLY TO ALL FRONTS. WE ARE NOT SAYING THAT AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO WITHDRAW FROM THE WEST BANK AND GAZA TERRITORY DETERMINES THE TIMING, CIRCUMSTANCES--OR EVEN THE EXTENT--OF ACTUAL WITHDRAWAL. THAT WOULD TAKE PLACE ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF A FINAL PEACE TREATY ENBODYING COMMITMENTS TO NORMAL PEACE--

FUL RELATIONS AND AGREED SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, INCLUDING  
POSSIBLY AGREED BORDER CHANGES.

--WE ARE NOT ASKING ISRAEL FOR ONE-SIDED COMPROMISES. OVER  
THE PAST MONTHS, WE HAVE MADE IT PLAIN TO THE ARAB SIDE  
THAT WE DO NOT AGREE WITH KEY ELEMENTS OF THEIR POSITION.  
FOR INSTANCE, WE DO NOT AGREE WITH THEIR CALL FOR A PRIOR  
COMMITMENT OF ISRAEL TO TOTAL WITHDRAWAL--WHICH RESOLUTION  
242 NEITHER ENDORSES NOR PRECLUDES. WE HAVE ALSO MADE  
CLEAR WE FAVOR A PALESTINIAN ENTITY LINKED TO JORDAN RATHER  
THAN AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE.  
--BUT THE PEACE-MAKING PROCESS MUST BE SEEN AS A SEQUENCE  
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OF COMPROMISES AS ONE SIDE AND THE OTHER FACE KEY ISSUES  
OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

--LAST NOVEMBER PRESIDENT SADAT--WITHOUT ANY PRIOR NOTICE  
TO US--INDICATED BY WORD AND DEED IN JERUSALEM THAT THE KEY  
ARAB STATE WAS READY TO MAKE PEACE WITH ISRAEL. TO THE  
ARAB SIDE THIS WAS AN ENORMOUS COMPROMISE.

--ISRAEL AND EGYPT HAVE HAD DIFFERENT PERCEPTIONS OF WHAT  
SHOULD FOLLOW FROM THAT ACT. THESE DIFFERENCES HAVE BE-  
DEVILLED THE DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BEGUN IN JERUSALEM. OUR  
ROLE AS MIDDLEMAN HAS BEEN TO HELP MOLD THE PERCEPTIONS  
OF WHAT EACH SEES AS THE PRACTICAL APPROACH TO THE NEGOTIA-  
TIONS, SO AS TO GET THEM BACK TO THE BARGAINING TABLE.

--WE ARE NOT SIMPLY A POSTMAN BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. AT  
DECISIVE POINTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, WHERE WE SEE IT HELP-  
FUL TO MOVE THINGS FORWARD, WE GIVE OUR OWN IDEAS. THAT  
WAS THE WAY THE AGENDA FOR THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE MEETING  
IN JERUSALEM WAS RESOLVED LAST JANUARY--OUR PROPOSAL BROKE  
THE IMPASSE.

--THAT MAY OCCUR AGAIN, THOUGH NO DECISION HAS BEEN MADE  
ON HOW OR WHEN WE MIGHT PUT FORWARD FURTHER U.S. SUGGESTIONS.

--THOUGH NEXT STEPS IN THIS PROCESS ARE UNDER ACTIVE CON-  
SIDERATION, WHAT THEY ARE AND THEIR TIMING DEPEND STILL  
UPON THE CONTINUING CONTACTS WITH ISRAEL AND EGYPT

PANAMA

Q: WHY IS THE PRESIDENT GOING TO PANAMA NOW WHEN THE  
TREATIES CANNOT TAKE EFFECT UNTIL NEXT APRIL ACCORDING  
TO THE BROOKE RESERVATION ADOPTED BY THE SENATE? ALSO,  
DOESN'T THE WELCOME LAST SATURDAY RECEIVED BY ANNULFO  
ARIAS, WHOM TORRIJOS DEPOSED IN 1968, SUGGEST THAT THE  
PRESIDENT'S VISIT RUNS COUNTER TO THE WISHES OF THE PANA-  
MANIAN PEOPLE? FINALLY, WHY IS THE PRESIDENT GOING TO  
PANAMA WHEN IT HAS REPUDIATED, AS SENATOR HELMS SAID LAST  
WEEK, THE SENATE'S ACTION ON THE TREATIES?

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A: --THE VISIT IS TO DELIVER AND RECEIVE THE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION APPROVED BY BOTH COUNTRIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES. IT WILL GIVE BINDING EFFECT TO THE TREATIES WE HAVE CONCLUDED WITH PANAMA ON THE CANAL.

.-OUR INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION WILL CONTAIN ALL OF THE AMENDMENTS, RESERVATIONS, CONDITIONS AND UNDERSTANDINGS ADOPTED BY THE SENATE.

--OBVIOUSLY, THIS EVENT COULD NOT TAKE PLACE WITHOUT PANAMA'S ACCEPTANCE OF ALL OF THESE. WE HAVE CONSULTED THE SENATE LEADERSHIP AND THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE WITH RESPECT TO THESE INSTRUMENTS. A NUMBER OF SENATORS WILL ACCOMPANY HIM FOR THIS EVENT.

--THE EFFECTIVE DATE FOR THE EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS WILL BE BY APRIL 1, 1979 UNLESS THE CONGRESS PASSES IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION BEFORE THEN. THIS KEEPS FAITH WITH THE TIME-TABLE SET BY THE SENATE. THE CONGRESS, THEREFORE, SHOULD HAVE AMPLE TIME TO ENACT THE NECESSARY LEGISLATION PRIOR TO OCTOBER 1 OF NEXT YEAR WHEN THE TREATIES WILL ENTER INTO FORCE.

--THE BREVITY AND CEREMONIAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT WILL PROBABLY PRECLUDE HIS MEETING WITH MR. ARIAS. WE ARE IMPRESSED BY THE POLITICAL FREEDOM WHICH THE EVENTS SURROUNDING HIS ARRIVAL IN PANAMA DEMONSTRATE. OTHERS WITH THE PRESIDENT MAY MEET WITH PANAMANIAN LEADERS FROM VARIOUS SECTORS OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT.

VIETNAM -- NORMALIZATION PROCESS

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Q: WHERE DO WE STAND IN OUR RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM RIGHT NOW? HOW HAVE RECENT EVENTS--SUCH AS THE HUMPHREY-TRUONG ESPIONAGE TRIAL--AFFECTED THE NORMALIZATION PROCESS?

A: --OBVIOUSLY THE EVENTS WHICH LED TO THE TRIAL OF RONALD HUMPHREY AND DAVID TRUONG, INCLUDING THE EXCLUSION OF THE VIETNAMESE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, DINH BA THI, CANNOT BE HELPFUL IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. BUT WE HOPE THAT THESE EVENTS WILL NOT IMPEDE OUR

RELATIONS IN SUCH A WAY AS TO PRECLUDE OUR MOVING FORWARD WITH NORMALIZATION TALKS.

--OUR POSITION CONTINUES TO BE THAT NORMALIZATION SHOULD BE ACHIEVED ON THE BASIS OF FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND THE EXCHANGE OF EMBASSIES WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. ONCE EMBASSIES ARE IN PLACE, WE WOULD LIFT THE TRADE AND INVESTMENT EMBARGO.

ARMS SALES TO CHINA

Q: THE PRESIDENT HAS REPORTEDLY STATED THAT THE US WILL RAISE NO OBJECTION TO ARMS SALES TO CHINA BY THIRD COUNTRIES.

IS THAT REPORT ACCURATE--IS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION?

A: --OUR POLICY ON US ARMS SALES TO CHINA IS CLEAR. WE ARE NOT GOING TO SELL ARMS TO THE PRC. ARMS SALES BY THIRD COUNTRIES FALL PRIMARILY WITHIN THE DOMAIN OF THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED. HOWEVER, WE DO HAVE LEGITIMATE CONCERNS WITH ANY SALES. FIRST, THAT THEY NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT OUR OWN SECURITY OR THAT OF OUR ALLIES IN EAST ASIA OR HAVE A DESTABILIZING EFFECT IN THAT REGION. AND SECOND, THAT ANY SUCH SALES DO NOT ADVERSELY EFFECT THE MAINTENANCE OF THE COCOM SYSTEM.

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Q: HAVE YOU IN FACT "GIVEN THE NOD" TO FRENCH SALES OF THE HOT ANTI-TANK MISSILE:

A: I AM NOT PREPARED TO COMMENT ON ANY SPECIFIC OR HYPOTHETICAL SALE BY A THIRD COUNTRY. I WILL STAND ON MY COMMENTS ABOVE. CHRISTOPHER UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

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